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Objectives of the reform 
Every pension reform creates a tension between -at least- two main objectives: (i) 
increase pensions of those already affiliated and coverage among workers, and (ii) the 
fiscal cost of running the pension system. From an optimal policy design, the reform 
should maximize the first objective minimizing the second objective. Along with that, a 
pension reform might reshape the financial system fostering the development of bond 
markets, including both the corporate sector and the government as well. 
In the case of Peru, the pension reform was done in 1993 under very special 
circumstances. First, it was done the year after President Fujimori dissolved the 
Congress and amid a fiscal crisis. Second, it was the first country which reformed its 
pension system using the Chilean reform blueprint. Given those circumstances it is hard 
to argue which objective was at the heart of the reformers, but the end result was one in 
which the fiscal stance worked as a severe constraint in the design of the new pension 
system.  Even though the initial idea was to increase the role of the private sector as 
much as possible, the strong opposition to this reform created a parallel system in which 
both the private and the public pension system serve the same market. This was in some 
sense a contradiction of one of the objectives of the reform. There was a huge need to 
stay away from the poor track record of the government as a pension fund administrator 
but the reform did not remove the government from its role as pension manager. 
It is important to mention that in every pension reform, even in those in which the 
former public pension system is closed to new entrants, the government keeps playing a 
role and therefore paying a transition cost. This cost will be given by the sum of (i) 
those pensions already generated, (ii) the value of recognition bonds that represent the 
stock of contributions made to the public pension system by those switching to the 
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private pension system, (iii) any other pension guarantee offered (i.e. non-contributory 
but means-tested universal pension, or minimum pension). All these items represent the 
fiscal cost of the reform.  
How successful was the Peruvian pension reform? First, the reform did create a 
mechanism to escape –though partially- from government intervention. This has opened 
up a window of opportunity to increase the level of pensions to those workers affiliated 
with the private pension system. Second, the reform did limit the fiscal cost associated 
with the transition to a parallel system although opened up other potential sources to 
additional fiscal costs. Third, the reform was unable to increase coverage among those 
workers that were not affiliated. As a consequence more than 80 percent of the 
workforce remains uncovered either by the public or the private pension system. The 
priorities of a pension system should be to (i) avoid poverty in old-age and (ii) allow 
individuals to smooth their consumption through their life cycle. As far as the first is far 
more important than the second, coverage should be the key criteria to judge the 
performance of the reformed systems and universal coverage should be the target to 
achieve. 
Just reforming the second pillar and forcing individuals to contribute into their own 
accounts is not enough to increase coverage. Something else should be done to increase 
the group willing to participate in the reform modifying tax and labor codes that reduce 
the size of the formal sector within an economy. The complementary of these three 
reforms is clear. Therefore, seems to be crucial both towards achieving better coverage 
ratios and achieving higher growth impacts as well to implement reforms in all fronts. 
The reasons why the government was able to contain the fiscal cost of the reform lie on 
three main factors. The policy decisions were to replace –partially- the PAYG system 
with a fully funded individual capitalization system managed privately with many 
constraints. Along with that, the government (i) instead of closing the public system 
only restricted the possibility of going back and forth from the public to the private 
system, (ii) put a ceiling on the transition costs introducing recognition bonds with 
many restrictions and (iii) did not introduce a minimum pension guarantee for the 
private pension system (it was introduced with strict limits in 2002). 
How can pension reform affect the foundations for growth 
The economic impact of a pension reform must be addressed with a long-term 
perspective. Its potential effects are focused on fiscal stability, the gains in efficiency as 
  
 
the government relies on the private sector to deliver pensions, and the increase in 
financial deepening that might lead to a wider access to financing.  However, the gains 
of the reform are not only easily reaped  but also it entails several risks.  For instance, 
the reform makes explicit the value of the contingent debt related to pension provision. 
The management of fiscal accounts could be forced to improve as the government is left 
without an easy source of funding. But there is a huge risk expressed in the transition 
cost of the reform. If the government does not reduce the future outlays it might be also 
reducing the growth prospects. In what follows we discuss five areas in which the 
pension reform might enhance the foundations for growth in the case of Peru. 
 
i. Property rights. This is probably the foundation that has been more affected 
by this reform. One of the key aspects of the reform was to protect the 
workers right to a pension given the fact that he has contributed during his 
years prior to reach retirement age. The pension within a PAYG system 
depends substantially on a government decision. The level of the pension is 
not necessarily linked to the amount of contributions made to the system. 
Given that the PAYG system is based on a solidarity principle in which 
everyone contributes to a single pool of funds, the property rights are 
vaguely defined.  In contrast, in a fully-funded system of individual 
capitalization accounts property rights are tightly defined. However, as the 
system remains under government supervision and more importantly under 
government regulation, there is plenty of room for government policies that 
might limit the privateness of the allegedly private pension system. For 
example, investment policies that impose a minimum share of government 
debt in pension fund portfolios are imposing risk and return conditions that 
might not be consistent with affiliates’ preferences. Some regulatory policies 
limiting risk diversification could be seen as taxes on pension funds.2 
Securing the property right of future pension holders is a first stepping-stone 
but if investment policies of those funds are not market-based the growth 
effect of those funds might be lessen.  
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ii. Equal opportunity:  One of the preconditions for growth is the existence of 
funding available to the best investment projects. The absence of available 
funds will incentive the existence of non-market-based methods to allocate 
those funds. The reform has generated a new source of funding opportunities 
across the financial market. The rapid growth of the pension funds has 
created the possibility for a new set of firms to move out of the standard 
bank loan as their typical financing decision.3 The corporate bonds market 
has developed rapidly although still limited to medium to large companies. 
In that sense, this reform has a lot of potential to address one of the main 
obstacles to growth in these economies: the access to financing. 
iii. Increased competition: Compared with the pre-reform situation the 
introduction of privately-managed pension fund managers has increased the 
level of competition. This comes both from domestic firms and foreign firms 
as well.  However, there is a generalized perception that this level is not very 
high compared across the board of other sectors in the economy. Even 
though the ROE of the pension fund managers has hovered around double 
digits in the last ten years there has been little action to contest the market 
share. The main problem faced by entry firms is that the private pension 
market is not highly contestable as affiliates do not seem to care much about 
the price they pay. In Berstein and Ruiz (2005) study on the individual 
decisions of Chilean affiliates the evidence supports zero price elasticity. 
This has lead to many proposals to reduce transaction costs associated with 
moving from one pension fund manager (AFP) to another. In many countries 
now this procedure is done over the internet, without paying a fee and 
reducing the time interval between transfers. Inasmuch as more competition 
has not been key to lure more affiliates, the growth effect has been 
minimized. 
iv. Broad participation: As mentioned before the reform has not increased 
pension coverage in those sectors previously not covered. However, it has 
opened the access to equity to a larger share of the population that did not 
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participate in the financial market holding those kinds of assets. In that 
sense, there is a larger set of the population that might feel more directly the 
potential impact of policies that harm the profitability of firms.  But the main 
point here is that the decision of containing the fiscal cost of the reform has 
put the whole reform in danger as it is seen as that a more generous pension 
system has been replaced by a system in which only a thin minority receives 
handsome pensions.  
v. Macro stability: The pension reform was designed to contain the fiscal 
contingencies. In that sense the reform has served the purpose to avoid fiscal 
surprises. The reform has helped to clarify the real value of the contingencies 
already assumed by the government.  The rapid grow of the private pension 
fund has also served as a relatively cheap source of funds for the 
government. 
 
What local features can constraint the effectiveness of the reform in 
delivering growth 
i. Problems of design:  
a. The public pension system was not closed as part of the pension reform. 
In contrast to what Chile did, in Peru new workers could choose to enroll 
in the public pension system. This has had the effect of reducing the size 
of the market for the private pension fund administrators and perhaps 
more importantly to keep the idea that the government could provide 
better pensions through its own system. Regulations related to 
contributions or investment policies are not symmetric across the public 
and the private pension system. The reform of the pension system for 
military and police forces is still pending.  
b. There are complementary reforms that need to be done to get the most 
out of this reform. A major problem in all countries has been to adopt 
investment regulations that are consistent with the corporate structure in 
Latin America. The regulatory framework has ignored this fact and has 
stayed its focus on government bonds, large corporate firms’ equity and 
bonds, and bank deposits. This has left out of the picture most of firms 
  
 
which are smaller, family-owned and somehow reluctant to open to 
public scrutiny. 
c. Along the same line, given the limited size of the financial market and 
the relatively small set of financial assets available to pension fund 
administrators the rapid growth of the pension fund might end up forcing 
managers to invest in low-yield assets or concentrating their investments 
in the domestic market. The relative size of the transactions in any 
particular asset should be small enough to avoid generating larger 
fluctuations as a result of an investment decision. 
 
ii. Obstacles from the local environment:  
a. Given the structure of the labor market characterized by two thirds of the 
labor force holding an informal sector job, the size of the potential 
market is limited. The pension reform introduced a government mandate 
to force contributions coming out of the workers’ pocket. For that 
mandate to be enforced contribution to the pension fund should be the 
default option. However, that only happens in the case of dependent 
workers. For the case of independent workers, such as self-employed the 
default option is not to contribute. The Peruvian workforce is comprised 
by 20 percent of formal workers, 50 percent of independent and informal 
workers, 22 percent of dependent but informal workers and 8 percent of 
unemployed workers. Only the first segment could participate in the 
pension system as it has been designed. In contrast Chile has two thirds 
of dependent workers. That is why the lack of coverage is intertwined 
with the characteristics of the labor market and it is not a flaw of the 
pension fund administrators. 
b. The initial design of the system was not aimed to enhance pension 
coverage. The degree of social exclusion has fueled along with the 
coexistence of the public pension system a constant political pressure to 
undo this reform. In the last five years more than 800 initiatives have 
been tabled in the Peruvian Congress aimed to change pension 
legislation.  In contrast to other countries experiences, in Peru the design 
of the initial reform was tilted against those who transferred to the 
private system. For example, rather strict rules for accessing the 
  
 
minimum pension guarantee in the private pension system, problems 
granting recognition bonds or generous increases in the minimum 
pension of the public pension.  
How can obstacles be by-passed (or resolved if possible)? 
i. Dealing with problems of design: 
a. The government has been hesitant to introduce reforms in this area. This 
has increased the fiscal cost and it has also increased the administrative 
cost faced by workers affiliated to the private pension system as 
economies or scale are being limited. 
b. In some countries, including Peru, the regulators are shaking off its 
concerns about pension funds investing in a larger set of assets. For 
example, rules have been changed to allow AFPs to invest in 
infrastructure bonds in Chile or in long-term projects as the gas pipeline 
for Camisea in Peru. But more could be done. Among the ideas 
suggested to broaden the base of assets are: securitized bonds, mortgage 
securities, and collateralized loan obligations (see CLAAF Statement 13 
for further discussion of the relevance of this set of financial assets). 
c. The most sensible way to avoid this problem is to increase the current 
ceiling to invest abroad. It is true that the existence of the pension funds 
has been the force behind the rapid development of new markets as the 
corporate bond market or the domestic government debt market. 
However, the growing size of the pension funds will continue its way 
whether the domestic financial market is ready or not. 
 
ii. By-passing obstacles from the local environment: 
a. There have been private attempts to tap the self-employed segment of the 
market with not so good results so far. One possibility is to create an 
incentive to participate in the system or as it is being discussed in Chile 
make that contributing to the pension system be the default option for 
independent workers. In other countries there are tax incentives to 
contribute to save for your own pension. Although, all of these schemes 
based on fiscal incentives have had limited success in other countries.  
  
 
b. In order to reduce social exclusion and broad the pool of beneficiaries of 
reform, the government could introduce non-contributory pensions for 
old age workers –currently not covered- that are in poverty or extreme 
poverty. The potential cost of this reform could be around 0.3 percent of 
the GDP according to Carranza (2005)- which is a small fraction of the 
total amount currently spent in pensions (3.0 percent of GDP). The 
coverage among old-age people could increase from 14 percent to 40 
percent. In addition, the minimum pension guarantee in the private 
pension system should be reformed to match what it is offered in the 
public system. Even though this might be seen as increasing the fiscal 
cost of the transition it also be considered as a preemptive measure to 
bolster the political sustainability of the reform. 
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